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INETEEN SIXTY-EIGHT was a year of inter-
esting developments with respect to the balance of
payments. The virtual elimination of the United States
trade surplus was associated with a strong improve-
ment in the overall balance of payments, and the
rapid domestic inflation manifested in a4per cent
decline in the purchasing power of the dollar has
coincided with a revival in foreign confidence in the
dollar and the United States economy in general.
These seemingly paradoxical events will be consid-
ered in this article.
Shifts in Components of Balance
of Payments
The overall balance of payments has improved and
there has been a sharp change in its components in
the first three quarters of 1968, compared with 1967
(see table). The trade surplus, a traditionally strong
component of the United States balance of payments
accounts, declined from $3.5 billion in 1967 to an $0.8
billion annual rate in the first three quarters of 1968.
The capital account, generally an area of weakness
in the balance of payments, showed an improvement
from a deficit of $2.8 billion to a surplus of about $1.4
billion in the first half of 1968. The Government
sector (excluding military purchases and sales) also
showed a strong improvement. However, this was
due almost entirely to a unique and non-recurring
transfer between the Canadian and the United States
Governments of $500 million in May, 1968.’
The net effect of the weakness in the trade account
and the strength in the capital and Government ac-
counts was an improvement in the overall balance of
payments. On the liquidity basis, the $3.6 billion
deficit in 1967 became a $1.1 billion annual rate of
deficit in the first three quarters of 1968, while on
the Official Settlements basis the $3.4 billion deficit
in 1967 became a $1.8 billion annual net surplus in
the first three quarters of 1968. These sharp changes
in the trade balance and in the private capital ac-
count can be attributed partially to developments
within the United States and partially to develop-
ments abroad.
1
This article will consider only the U.S. balance of payments.
A forthcoming article will consider other international eco-
noinic topics.
‘The Canadian government purchased $500 million of special
nomnarketable, medium-term U.S. Government securities
under the U.S-Canadian reserve agreement. In substance,
the United States agreed to exempt Canada from the Interest
Equalization Tax, and Canada agreed not to increase its
international reserves above a certain limit.
Domestic Pa.ctors
Trade Account — During 1968 the United States
economy has been characterized by rapid growth
in real income with virtually full employment and
an acceleration in prices. These domestic factors
contributed to rapid growth in imports and there-
fore to a decline in the trade balance, Larger real
incomes resulted in an increase in foreign as well
as domestic purchases, with foreign purchases ac-
celerated partially because domestic labor resources
were fully employed. In addition, domestic prices
increased relative to foreign prices, and more favor-
able prices of foreign products induced a substitution
of foreign goods for domestic goods by United States
firms and households. Consequently, while real in-
come increased 6 per cent between the third quarter
of 1967 and the third quarter of 1968, and prices
increased 4 per cent, imports increased by a phenom-
enal 37 per cent.’ The trend rate of import growth












Capital Account — The major factor contributing to
the improvement in the balance of payments in 1968
was the shift in private capital flows from an outflow
to an inflow. One possible explanation for this switch
‘There were also some special factors which tended to accel-
erate imports during the four quarters ending September
1968. The strike in the United States copper industry
forced domestic consumers to purchase foreign copper rather
than domestic copper, and the anticipated strike in the steel
industry encouraged domestic consumers to establish foreign
sources of supply in case their domestic sonrce of supply
was severed.
Page 15was the President’s expanded Foreign Credit Re-
straint Program (F.C.R.) announced on January 1,
1968. This program, as eventually implemented, re-
stricted the outflow of corporate and banking capital.
Two earlier Administration attempts to improve
the balance of payments by restricting capital flows,
the Interest Equalization Tax (I.E.T.) originally pro-
posed in July 1963, and the first Voluntary Foreign
Credit Restraint Program (V.F.C.R.) announced in
February 1965, have not had discernibly beneficial
effects on the balance of payments in the long run.’
Following announcement of the 1963 I.E.T. pro-
gram, the overall balance of payments improved for
about six months and then deteriorated as those capi-
tal items not subject to the I.E.T. (largely bank
loans) increased rapidly. By the second half of 1984
the overall balance of payments had returned to its
weak position of the previous year.
The V.F.C.R. Program inaugurated in February
1965 was also followed by a balance-of-payments im-
provement for about six months. However, with the
escalation of the Vietuam War and shrinkage in the
trade surplus, this improvement was not sustained.
By the second half of 1967 the deficit was as large
as it had been prior to February 1965. Yet, the
V.F.C.R. actions in 1965 seemed to have a longer and
more beneficial effect on the capital account than
the I.E.T. With respect to the four quarters just be-
fore and just after February 1965, short-term capital
went from $--2.0 billion to $0.6 billion, and long-term
capital from $—4.3 billion to $—2.7 billion. This was
probably because these Administrative actions co-
incided with a rise in United States interest rates
relative to those of foreign countries, especially Japan.
This tightening in domestic financial markets made
it easier for banks and corporations to comply with
the program without being in serious conflict with
their profit objectives.
The Foreign Credit Restraint Program now in
effect appears to be more effective than earlier pro-
grams because the forces of the market, specifically,
high interest rates, have complemented it. Inflation
in the United States implies not only that the prices
of commodities and services are rising, but that the
price of financial assets4 is rising if, as is the case
in 1968, inflationary expectations are strong. If the
general price level is expected to rise, purchasers of
financial assets will demand a higher nominal return
3
For a detailed explanation of these programs, see the Decem-
ber 1966 issue of this Review, p. 21.
~The price of a financial asset is most appropriately measured
by its market yield rather than by its market price. This is
because the yield represents the cost of issuing and the
benefits of purchasing financial assets. The relation between
market price (P) and market yield (r) is as follows:
P (1/r).
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the suppliers of financial assets will be willing to pay
a higher nominal return on the expectation that con-
tinued inflation will ease the burden of interest
payments in the future.
A rise in domestic interest rates has the short-term
effect of making United States financial assets more
attractive than foreign financial assets. Consequently,
United States funds which would otherwise have
gone abroad in 1968 stayed at home, and foreign
funds which would otherwise have been invested
abroad were attracted to the United States. In addi-
tion, United States corporations making direct invest-
ments abroad have had more of an interest rate
incentive to finance these investments in foreign
rather than in United States financial markets. United
States corporate borrowing in Europe was $1,087
million in the first half of 1968, compared with just
$440 million in all of 1967 when United States Cor-
porate Aaa bond yields rose to 6.2 per cent from 5.5
per cent.
Consequently, the net private capital outflow of
$2.8 billion in 1967 became a net private capital
inflow of about $1.4 billion in the first half of 1968,
measured on a liquidity basis. This major reversal in
the capital account substantially exceeded the guide-
Page 16lines specified in the January 1, 1968 program. The
rise in United States interest rates was probably a
major factor in this occurrence.
Capital inflows associated with high interest rates
and domestic inflation may only be temporary. If the
inflation and high interest rates continue for an ex-
tended period, individuals may become fearful that
the decline in the domestic value of the dollar will
force a devaluation in the international value of the
currency. Such expectations could lead to a specula-
tive capital outflow. As is obvious from recent British
experience, no matter how high domestic interest
rates are, expectations of a devaluation can cause a
large capital outflow.
The present healthy glow in the United States
balance of payments may therefore be a sign of in-
flation fever associated with the boom phase of the
business cycle rather than recovery in the balance of
payments. If and when the present rapid inflationary
pace is slowed, the short-term effects on the capital
account may be adverse. Containing inflation will
cause market interest rates to decline, reducing the
short-term incentive to invest in the United States
financial assets, and causing a decline or reversal in
the recent capital inflow. However, this would
probably cause only a temporary weakness in the
balance of payments.
Foreign Factors
While the primary factors in recent balance-of-
payments developments can be ascribed to domestic
conditions, developments abroad also played an im-
portant role. The higher rate of economic growth in
Europe in 1968 relative to 1967 has encouraged
United States exports to grow at a rate of 18.2 per
cent in the first three quarters of 1968, more than
double the trend rate of 7.0 per cent between 1960
and 1966. The rapid growth in United States exports
largely to Europe helped prevent the decline in the
United States trade balance from being much worse,
The continued uncertainties with respect to the
British balance of payments, and speculation against
the French franc after the May 1968 crisis, have
resulted in capital outflows from those countries. The
outflow of funds from England and France was
largely deposited in the Euro-dollar market where
branches of United States commercial banks aggres-
sivelybid for them. When these funds are transferred
to the head office in the United States, they are
recorded as a capital inflow on the Official Settle-
ments measure of the balance of payments. (See
pages 18 and 19 for an explanation of the various
balance of payments measures).
If United States commercial banks had not been
aggressively bidding for Euro-dollar funds, those
selling francs and sterling probably would have pur-
chased more deutsche marks than they actually did.
The demand by United States banks kept the Euro-
dollar rates high and rising so that the decline in
official holdings of dollars by the French and British
was not matched by an equal increase in official
dollar holdings by central banks of other countries in
the first three quarters of 1968.~It is still too early to
tell what effects will result in the fourth quarter of
1968 from the massive currency speculation in
November 1968.
Conclusion
The virtual elimination of the United States trade
surplus has been associated with a strong improve-
ment in the overall balance of payments in 1968, due
to the initially favorable effects inflation and high
interest rates have on the capital account. The rise
in interest rates will continue to attract foreign funds
into the United States until such time as the continu-
ing inflation and declining purchasing power of the
dollar lead to speculation of devaluation of the dollar.
The United States is presently in the position where
inflation has encouraged the capital inflow, but has
not created strong expectations of devaluation.
The improved international position of the dollar,
in spite of what for the United States is a heavy
inflationary period, can only be partially explained
by Administrative actions and rising interest rates.
Perhaps an equally important reason is political rather
than economic. Recent events in Europe may have
convinced some people that the underlying political
stability of the United States, in spite of well-
publicized riots and disorders, may be greater than
that of Europe. This attitude has undoubtedly in-
fluenced some Europeans to invest their funds in the
United States.
tm
It is difficult to say whether the improvement in the United
States capital account was due to the problems faced by
France and England, which caused a decline in their hold-
ings of dollars, or to high interest rates in the United
States, which made it attractive for United States banks to
borrow in the Euro-dollar market. If it had not been for the
incentive of United States banks to borrow, the decline in
official dollar balances of France and England probably would
have been matched by an increase in official dollar balances
of other countries, That is, the speculators would have moved
their funds not into the Euro-dollar market, but into some
other European currency.
There was a substantial speculation in deutsche marks in
September and in late November, 1968, but the German cen-
tral bank made it profitable for the German commercial banks
to reinvest balances in the Euro-dollar market which came
from selling deutsche marks to speculators.
Micusa W. KEBAN
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